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The purpose of this paper is, after briefly presenting why, when and how the 
Caribbean Court of Justice was created, to specifically show how unique the 
institution is, by examining its distinctive characteristics. Exercising both an 
appellate and an original jurisdiction, the institution functions as a domestic 
final Court of appeal shared by several sovereign States (appellate jurisdiction) 
and an international tribunal designed to settle disputes between the same 
sovereign States and, more generally, disputes related to the Caribbean 
Community (original jurisdiction). There is no equivalent institution in the 
world, which renders the study of the Caribbean Court of Justice particularly 
interesting from an international legal point of view and explains why “unique” 
is the adjective often used to describe the court.2 
The creation of many new tribunals and special chambers over the past twelve 
years has challenged the traditional and fairly well-established categorization of 
international and domestic tribunals.  The United Nations has established with 
several post-conflict States so-called internationalized or hybrid tribunals,3 
including the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes in Timor Leste, the ‘Regulation 64’ Panels in Kosovo and the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia. The War Crimes and 
Organized Crime Chambers in the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon are other examples of the new hybrid or 
internationalized institutions. Primarily these are domestic institutions in which 
international judges and/or prosecutors together with management and support 
staff work. The internationalization of the procedural rules applicable in some 
of the aforementioned courts or chambers is also noteworthy. This new 
category of “hybrid tribunal” encompasses many different types of institutions 
                                                 
1 PhD, Lecturer at the Irish Centre for Human Rights, National University of Ireland, Galway.  
2 Sir David Simmons, The Caribbean Court of Justice: a Unique Institution of Caribbean 
Creativity, 29 Nova L. Rev. 171 (2004-2005), 173. 
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and, in practice, the extent of the international imprint varies from one 
institution to the other. Yet, it is accurate to talk about a new mixed model that 
challenges the traditional categories of domestic and international tribunals. 
This new model is characterized by the intertwining of domestic and 
international legal features.  
 
In this context many questions can be asked about the Caribbean Court of 
Justice which was created in 2001. In this new Court, are the domestic and 
international legal features also intertwined or does it constitute another type of 
hybrid institution? In order to answer these questions, one needs to look at the 
criteria typically utilized to distinguish between domestic and international 
courts (1) and to compare them to the Caribbean Court of Justice’s main 
features in order to identify the precise nature of the Court (2). Finally, the 
practical consequences of such nature will have to be considered, as well as 
another distinct feature of the Court, the fact that it is shared by distinct 
sovereign states (3). 
 
1. The Criteria Relating to Domestic and International Courts 
 
International courts can be described as “judicial bodies, composed of 
independent judges, whose tasks are to adjudicate disputes on the basis of 
international law according to a pre-determined set of rules of procedure, and to 
render decisions which are binding upon the parties.”4 Traditionally, an 
international court had to be set up on the basis of an international convention5 
but this particular characteristic was called into question in the 1990s by the 
creation of two international tribunals by the United Nations Security Council, 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia6 and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.7 As a result, establishment by an 
international treaty can no longer be considered an essential trait of 
international courts.  
The criterion of the independence of the judges is debatable to the extent that it 
refers to the quality of the court and does not clearly play a role in the 
determination of the nature of the body as an international judicial one,8 and not 
                                                 
4 Christian Tomuschat, International Courts and Tribunals, in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.), 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Volume II (1995), 1108. 
5 Hermann Mosler, Judgments of International Courts and Tribunals, in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.), 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Volume III (1995), 31. 
6 UN Security Council Res. 808 (1993). 
7 UN Security Council Res. 955 (1994). 
8 Moreover, even the role of the independence of the judges as a proof of the effectiveness of 
the international judicial body is questioned. According the certain scholars, the fact that the 
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even as a judicial one for that matter. Examining the composition of the body, 
however, may prove useful. If all the judges possess the same nationality, this is 
clear evidence that the court is a domestic one. Conversely, if each individual 
judge holds a different nationality, this is clear evidence that the court is an 
international one. But this is not a deciding factor in the sense that domestic law 
does not necessarily require a condition of nationality in order to be a member 
of the judiciary. In other words, foreign judges may sit on the bench of a 
domestic court without jeopardizing its domestic nature. Moreover, in 
international law, certain arbitral tribunals consist of one single judge. In those 
cases, there is only one nationality represented on the bench, but this does not 
question the international nature of the body.9 
International courts adjudicate disputes “on the basis of international law”. The 
existence of “objective rules derived from general international law and treaty 
law effective between the parties, to guide the judges in determining the law 
applicable”10 appears to be a very important characteristic of the international 
judicial body. However, the distinction between domestic and international 
tribunals does not rest solely on the applicable law. Domestic courts in a 
number of states, particularly in Europe, directly apply international treaty and 
customary law on a very regular basis, while obviously remaining domestic 
judicial bodies. Hence, the nature of the law applicable is not an exclusive 
criterion. Nevertheless, ascertaining the nature of the law primarily applicable 
by the judicial body is a good way to distinguish between domestic and 
international tribunals. Whereas overlaps exist between the domestic and the 
international legal orders, they remain largely distinct; a given legal rule can in 
most cases be identified as coming from either a domestic formal source of law 
– Constitution, legislation, decree, case law,… – or an international formal 
source of law – mainly treaty and custom. A court primarily responsible for 
settling disputes according to international law is an international court, while a 
                                                                                                                                  
judges must be independent is evidence for a virtuous court in the domestic sphere, but given 
“the profound differences between the settings in which domestic and international courts 
operate”, “independence prevents international tribunals from being effective” (Eric A. Posner 
and John C. Yoo, A Theory of International Adjudication, John M. Olin Law & Economics 
Working Paper No. 206 (2d series), February 2004, The Law School of the University of 
Chicago, available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html (last visited 30 
January 2008), 6, 10). 
9 Carlo Santulli, Les juridictions de l’ordre international: essai d’identification, XLVII 
Annuaire Français de Droit International 45 (2001), 49 ; Louis Cavaré, La notion de juridiction 
internationale, XII Annuaire Français de Droit International 496 (1956), 505. 
10 Hermann Mosler, Judgments of International Courts and Tribunals, in Rudolf Bernhardt 
(ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Volume III (1995), 31. 
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court primarily responsible for settling disputes according to domestic law is a 
domestic court. 
The existence of specific rules of procedure may also help in identifying 
whether a judicial body is a domestic or an international one, but this is not a 
deciding factor either. However helpful specific procedural rules may be, it is 
hard to think about rules that would be exclusively reserved for international 
adjudication. Moreover, certain international courts possess a rather complex 
set of procedural rules, most of them simply copied from domestic systems.11  
Another way to distinguish between international and domestic judicial bodies 
is to identify the name of the authority in which judicial decisions are made.12 If 
the decision is made in the name of a domestic authority, the body that has 
made the decision cannot be an international judicial body, and vice versa. This 
criterion amounts to examining the following question; which legal entity is the 
court or tribunal a judicial organ of ? The International Court of Justice is the 
principal judicial organ of the United Nations, hence automatically an 
international court. A domestic court of any state is a judicial organ of that 
state, hence automatically a domestic court. Although quite easy to use in 
theory, this criterion becomes harder to use each time it is in fact necessary, in 
other words when it is hard to categorize a particular organ.13 
Since it is impossible to find a deciding criterion based on the nature of the 
organ in itself, it may be useful to turn to criteria based on the nature of the act 
produced by the organ - the judicial decision. The law applicable to the dispute, 
in other words the contents of the decision, was already pointed out as a useful 
yet not deciding criterion, given the inevitable overlap between domestic and 
international law in modern legal systems. The other options all concern the law 
that governs the decision-making process leading in turn to the decision, and 
more particularly, in order to determine if a court is domestic or international, 
one may attempt to identify which legal order attributed the judicial power, 
which order attributed to the decision its judicial authority and finally which 
order attributed the jurisdictional function to the tribunal that took the 
decision.14  
                                                 
11 Carlo Santulli, Les juridictions de l’ordre international: essai d’identification, XLVII 
Annuaire Français de Droit International 45 (2001), 49-50 ; Louis Cavaré, La notion de 
juridiction internationale, XII Annuaire Français de Droit International 496 (1956), 508. 
12 Louis Cavaré, La notion de juridiction internationale, XII Annuaire Français de Droit 
International 496 (1956), 508-509. 
13 Carlo Santulli, Les juridictions de l’ordre international: essai d’identification, XLVII 
Annuaire Français de Droit International 45 (2001), 50. 
14 All these criteria are explored by Carlo Santulli, Les juridictions de l’ordre international: 
essai d’identification, XLVII Annuaire Français de Droit International 45 (2001), 56-61.  
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Although clear in theory, the determination of the legal order that has attributed 
the judicial power is not that easy to handle. For instance, the Washington 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States of 1965 provides for the possibility to create judicial 
bodies to settle disputes. The legal order that attributes the judicial power to 
these bodies is therefore the international order. Yet, such bodies may exercise 
their jurisdiction only when and because another act allows for it, often a 
contract, which is a domestic legal act. Thanks to the contract the dispute is 
brought before the judicial body. In that situation, it is unclear whether it is the 
treaty or the contract that attributes the power to decide. In fact, it is both. 
The determination of the legal order that gives the decision its judicial authority 
appears also difficult although it may seem easy at first glance. A decision by 
an international tribunal is authoritative and binding because this is provided for 
in an international treaty. Conversely, a decision by a domestic tribunal is 
authoritative because it is rendered by a state judicial organ. Therefore, the 
decision carries with it the authority of the state. Faced with concrete cases, 
however, this criterion does not appear to be a definitive one either. For 
instance, there exist many international treaties that bind state parties to the 
treaty to implement, at the domestic level, judicial decisions of another state. In 
this example the obligation, resting on State A, to implement the domestic 
judicial decision of State B emanates from a treaty which undoubtedly is an 
international legal norm. Does this mean that the decision of the Court in State 
B is international? The answer to the question is no.  
Finally, the only criterion left is the one that attempts to determine which legal 
order attributed the jurisdictional function to the tribunal that took the decision. 
The jurisdictional function consists of settling legal disputes - that is to decide 
which party’s submission of what the law says is the right one. Coming back to 
the Convention of Washington example, the tribunals established have 
jurisdiction to settle international legal disputes, even if it is both thanks to the 
treaty and to another act that the tribunal can actually function in practice. 
Nevertheless the order that has attributed the jurisdictional function to the 
tribunals is the international legal order. Coming back to the treaties that bind 
states parties to it to act domestically so that domestic judicial decisions of 
another state be executed within their territory, they may give the authority to 
the decision of State B in State A, but it remains that that the order that has 
attributed the jurisdictional function to the domestic court of state B is that 
state’s domestic legal order. 
Therefore, in order to determine whether a tribunal is domestic or international, 
one must answer the following question: which order attributed the 
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jurisdictional function? Is it the domestic legal order or the international legal 
order?  
Such an examination must not necessarily lead to setting aside the other criteria 
envisaged previously; the composition of the tribunal, the law applicable, the 
procedural rules and the authority in the name of which the judicial decision is 
made. Whereas none of them can be retained as a definitive criterion, they still 
enjoy some relevance. In fact determining if a court is domestic or international 
requires a simultaneous examination of a whole network of facts.  
 
2. Applying the Criteria to the Caribbean Court of Justice 
 
(a) Composition 
(b) Law applicable 
(c) Procedure 
(d) Authority in the name of which the judicial decision is made 
(e) Order that attributed the jurisdictional function to the tribunal that took the 
decision 
 
(a) Composition 
 
The bench of the Caribbean Court of Justice is very diverse. The President of 
the Court, Justice Michael de la Bastide, is from Trinidad and Tobago and so is 
Justice Rolston Nelson. Justice Désirée Bernard and Justice Duke E.E. Pollard 
are from Guyana. Justice Adrian Saunders is from Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines. Justice David Hayton, a national of the United Kingdom, was 
sworn in as a Judge of the CCJ by George Maxwell Richards, President of the 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, and so was Justice Jacob Wit, who is from 
the Netherlands Antilles and a Dutch national. This diversity would seem to 
imply that the CCJ is in fact an international tribunal. 
 
(b) Law applicable 
 
Article XVII of the Agreement Establishing the CCJ, entitled “Law to Be 
Applied by the Court in the Exercise of its Original Jurisdiction” reads as 
follows: “The Court, in exercising its original jurisdiction(…), shall apply such 
rules of international law as may be applicable.”15 When the Court exercises its 
appellate jurisdiction, it acts as the final Court of Appeal for the State from 
which the appeal originated. Hence, the law applicable to the dispute is then the 
domestic law of that state. Strictly speaking, this means that depending on 
                                                 
15 Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice (2001), Article XVII (1). 
 7
which jurisdiction it is exercising the law applicable by the Court will be 
different and the Court will act as an international court or a domestic court. 
According to this criterion, the only logical conclusion that can be drawn is that 
the Court truly has a double nature and that it is impossible to make a firm 
determination of the nature of the Court. What can be categorized are its acts, 
its decisions, but not the Court itself. 
 
(c) Procedure 
 
Similarly, the rules applicable differ depending on which jurisdiction it is 
exercising. According to the Agreement Establishing the CCJ, the President of 
the Court, in consultation with other judges was responsible for establishing 
rules for the exercise of both the original jurisdiction of the Court16 and the 
appellate jurisdiction conferred on the Court.17 Although two different sets of 
procedural rules were adopted,18 a close examination reveals numerous 
similarities between them, with regards to various matters from filing of 
documents19 to representation by attorneys-at-law, for instance the rules 
pertaining to their exclusion for misconduct20 or those regarding changes of 
attorneys,21 to mention but a few. As pointed out earlier, procedure before 
international courts did not develop in a vacuum. When states started to 
establish complex and permanent tribunals to settle their disputes, quite 
naturally, they were inspired by the rules applicable in their own domestic 
systems, which make it now impossible to identify rules that could be said to be 
truly of an international nature. 
 
(d) Authority in the name of which the judicial decision is made 
 
So far, only two states have accepted to make the CCJ their final Court of 
Appeal, Barbados and Guyana. For these countries, the CCJ is the final 
appellate body of the judiciary and, in that sense, the decisions made by the 
CCJ in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction are made in the name of these 
countries, not in the name of CARICOM, let alone in the name of the Court. 
Conversely, when the Court exercises its original jurisdiction, it will surely 
                                                 
16 Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice (2001), Article XXI (1). 
17 Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice (2001), Article XXV 7. (1). 
18 The Caribbean Court of Justice (Original Jurisdiction), Rules 2006, 24 March 2006 ; The 
Caribbean Court of Justice (Appellate Jurisdiction), Rules 2005, June 2005. 
19 Rules on Appellate Jurisdiction, Part 6, Rules on Original Jurisdiction, Part 9. 
20 Rule 4.5 on Appellate Jurisdiction, Rule 4.6 on Original Jurisdiction. 
21 Rule 4.6 on Appellate Jurisdiction, Rule 4.7 on Original Jurisdiction. 
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render decisions in the name of the international organization of which it is the 
judicial body, the Caribbean Community. 
 
(e) Order that attributed the jurisdictional function to the tribunal that took the 
decision 
 
Article XXV of the Agreement Establishing the CCJ provides that “in the 
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the Court is a superior Court of record with 
such jurisdiction and powers as are conferred on it by this Agreement or by the 
Constitution or any other law of a Contracting Party”.22 In other words, the 
jurisdictional function of the Court, when exercising its appellate jurisdiction, 
seems to be given to it both by an international treaty, the Agreement, and 
domestic law, it consisting of constitutional or lower rank norms. Does this 
mean that the decisions of the CCJ in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction 
are both domestic and international? This cannot be possible. In fact, the 
function of the Court when exercising its appellate jurisdiction is to settle 
domestic disputes, to decide which party’s interpretation of the domestic law is 
the right one. Of course, in doing so, the Court may base itself on international 
legal rules, but in the end the dispute that is being adjudicated is a domestic 
legal dispute. In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, then, the Court is a 
domestic tribunal. In the exercise of its original jurisdiction, however, the Court 
is an international tribunal because the Agreement Establishing the CCJ grants 
it the jurisdiction to settle international disputes, to determine which party’s 
submission is the right one under international law.  
 
Consideration of these elements lead to the same conclusion: the CCJ is both a 
domestic and an international Court. In that sense it is very different from the 
previous examples of hybrid Courts, that all involve domestic courts that have 
been internationalized through changes in the procedure and the law applicable 
to the disputes. But these disputes are domestic in nature and the function of 
these courts is to settle them based on domestic law. The CCJ, however, is not a 
tribunal in which domestic and international elements were mixed to create a 
third type of tribunal. The adjective “hybrid” means “of mixed character”.23 
The CCJ is therefore not a hybrid Court, since the two elements are not mixed 
but juxtaposed. In the Caribbean Court of Justice, domestic and international 
legal features are not intertwined, at least not formally, but they are side by 
side. In other words, the CCJ is not a mixed Court or a hybrid Court, it is, at 
least strictly speaking, a double Court. 
                                                 
22 Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice (2001), Article XXV (1). 
23 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2002. 
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Yet, it would be unrealistic to think that the exercise of the two types of 
jurisdiction by the same judicial body will be without consequences. Although 
clearly separated in theory, it will probably be difficult for the judges to 
maintain the two judicial functions of the Court strictly separated and points 
decided by the Court in the exercise of one of its functions are likely to be 
reused in the exercise of the other. Since domestic tribunals of different 
sovereign states as well as international tribunals tend to engage in transnational 
judicial dialogue,24 while being physically separated, one can assume that in an 
institution where the same judges will settle both domestic and international 
disputes, many overlapping opportunities will arise and the odds of keeping the 
exercise of the two jurisdictions strictly separated are low.  
 
3. Consequences of the Double Character of the Caribbean Court of 
Justice 
 
The CCJ constitutes a unique field of scholarly investigation in the area of 
transnational judicial dialogue and all its implications have yet to be elaborated. 
First and foremost, it is double in nature, which means that, as underlined 
above, the same judges are at the same time international and domestic judges, 
therefore more likely to be influenced by both orders and in particular, more 
likely to use international law in their rulings, which is one type of transnational 
dialogue. 
 
Second, the Court is shared by several sovereign states, which means that the 
same Court is the highest court of different sovereign states and that the same 
judges are the highest judges in more than one state. Given that transnational 
judicial dialogue consists of using decisions of courts in different countries, it is 
clear that the CCJ’s potential for transnational dialogue is very high. In this 
case, actually, it would perhaps be more appropriate to talk about 
harmonization of the law of different sovereign states rather than mere 
dialogue.  
Although not a new feature (the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is also 
shared by distinct sovereign states), the fact that the CCJ is a Court shared by 
several independent states is worth commenting. Does that challenge the 
independence of states? The States that have accepted the appellate jurisdiction 
on the CCJ have renounced a great deal of their judicial sovereignty. Until 
where can a state go to strip itself from its sovereignty ? For a state, the 
                                                 
24 Melissa A Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial 
Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 Geo. L. J. 487 (2004-2005). 
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pertinent question is where to draw the line between making use of its 
sovereignty and renouncing it?  
 
CPIJ, Case of S.S. Wimbledon, UK, France, Japan v Germany (Poland intervening), 17 August 
1923: “The Court declines to see in the conclusion of any Treaty by which a State undertakes to 
perform or refrain from performing a particular act an abandonment of its sovereignty. No 
doubt any convention creating an obligation of this kind places a restriction upon the exercise 
of the sovereign rights of the State, in the sense that it requires them to be exercised in a certain 
way. But the right of entering into international engagements is an attribute of State 
sovereignty” 
 
In that context, what is the difference between the situation when the Privy 
Council makes decisions and the situation when the CCJ does? Some argue that 
since one is a legacy of colonialism and the other is the result of a Caribbean 
empowerment, the two situations cannot be equated. Is this relevant? 
One of the arguments for the development of the Caribbean Court of Justice 
was that the decisions needed to be taken closer to the people, that there was a 
need for the development of a truly Caribbean case law, more in line with the 
peoples’ aspirations. This looks like a valid argument.25 Yet, while it is 
undeniable that the Caribbean States (micro states) do share many common 
features in terms of culture and ways of life, they remain sovereign states and 
one may wonder if the creation of a Court common to all of them does not 
amount, albeit to a lesser extent, to reproducing the errors of the past- that is to 
impose on a state decisions that may suit the majority of others but not this one 
in particular.  
It is all the more interesting that for some authors, strengthening sovereignty 
was a very important argument for the repatriation of justice in the Caribbean.26 
 
                                                 
25 Sir David Simmons, The Caribbean Court of Justice: a Unique Institution of Caribbean 
Creativity, 29 Nova L. Rev. 171 (2004-2005), 180-181. 
26 Sir David Simmons, The Caribbean Court of Justice: a Unique Institution of Caribbean 
Creativity, 29 Nova L. Rev. 171 (2004-2005), 182-183. 
